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SUMMARY 
In order to improve financial access to complementary health insurance (CHI) in France, a CHI voucher program, 
called Aide Complémentaire Santé (ACS) was introduced in 2005. Four years later, the program covered only 
18% of the eligible population. Two main hypotheses are put forward to account for this low take-up rate. The 
first one is related to the lack of information on the program itself and on its application process. While the 
second one considers that the amount of the financial support is too small to encourage people to purchase a 
CHI plan. We conduct a controlled experiment with the National Health Insurance Fund in order to assess these 
assumptions. A sample of eligible insurees living in an urban area in northern France were randomly split into 
three groups: a control group who received the standard level of financial aid, a group benefiting from a 75% 
voucher increase, and a third group benefiting from the same 75% voucher increase plus an invitation to an 
information meeting on ACS. 
After six months of follow-up, we observed how many application forms were sent back and how many of them 
entitled to ACS. Five main conclusions can be drawn from that analysis. (1) The voucher increase has a slight but 
statistically significant effect on ACS take-up. (2) It also allows better targeting of people actually eligible and 
thus reduces the number of ACS refusals due to resources above the upper limit. (3) However the invitation to 
the meeting seems unexpectedly to cancel the positive effect of the voucher increase when both treatments are 
applied jointly. (4) On the contrary, after controlling for potential selection bias, we observed that attending the 
briefing has a significant impact on ACS take-up. (5) This study confirms that ACS is complex and reaches poorly 
its target population. Only 17% of the insurees applied for ACS and only 9% of insures who were invited to the 
information briefing actually attended it. Moreover, previous CHI holders responded similarly to CHI non holders 
to treatments, which suggests that the central issue of ACS low take-up rate is not the CHI cost itself but most 
certainly the access to information, the burden and the complexity of the application process. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The  French  Social  Security  system  only  partially  covers,  about  75%  in  average,  healthcare 
expenditures (Compte de la Santé 2009). In order to reduce all or part of the remaining cost burden 
individuals can purchase a complementary health insurance (CHI) plan. This system raises then the 
issue of the financial access to care and the question of the affordability of CHI for the poorest 
                                                             
1   Correspondence to: LEDa-LEGOS, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris 
Cedex 16, France. E-mail : sophie.guthmuller@dauphine.fr. 2 
 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F., Wittwer J. March 2011. Affordability of Complementary Health Insurance in France: a Social Experiment 
households. Jusot and Wittwer showed in fact that in France, inequalities in access to health care are 
mainly explained by inequalities in access to CHI (Jusot & Wittwer, 2009). For example, according to a 
2006 survey
2, 32% of the non CHI policy holders, stated to have foregone  health care for financial 
reasons over the last twelve months, whereas this figure is 15% for the entire population. (Kambia-
Chopin & al., 2008). 
 
Since 2000, a free  and public  complementary health insurance called CMUC (Couverture maladie 
universelle complémentaire), has been available for low-income people which pays off most of the 
out-of-pocket expenses. Despite the existence of this free CHI plan, 7% remained uncovered. This 
figure is higher among households whose resources are just above the CMUC eligibility threshold and 
it strongly decreases with household income: 19% of the first income decile and 14% of the second 
income decile are uncovered (Arnould & Vidal, 2008).  
In order to improve financial access of these households to CHI, a voucher CHI program, called Aide 
Complémentaire Santé (ACS) was introduced in 2005. ACS is intended for households whose 
resources exceed 20%
3 of the free CHI plan eligibility threshold  and these households can benefit 
from that voucher regardless if whether or not they already hold a CHI plan. Uptake of ACS increased 
slowly  since  introduction  but  more  steadily  in  recent  months  thanks  to  several  information 
campaigns launched in January 2008 and lead by the mandatory health insurance funds. However, 
four years later, the program covered only 18% of the eligible population (see figure 1).  
Two main hypotheses can be formulated to explain this fact.  The first one is related to the lack of 
information on the program itself and on its application process. It is the main hypothesis explai ning 
the non-take-up of eligible holders of  an individual CHI whose do not assert their right, and also 
support the information campaign in place since 2008. The second  hypothesis considers that the 
voucher is insufficient. That hypothesis concerns directly eligible individuals not covered by a CHI and 
means that CHI remains unaffordable even  after  deducting  the voucher  value. Indeed, the  ACS 
voucher covers on average only 50% of contract premiums (Fonds CMU, 2008)
4. Before deduction of 
the ACS voucher, these premiums  may also represent  nearly 10% of  the income of the poorest 
households (Kambia-Chopin et al., 2008; Legal et al.,2008). This second hypothesis can be extended 
to CHI beneficiaries on the premise that the application process is a cost which is not entirely covered 
by the financial benefit of the voucher. 
Fear of stigmatization is also a major reason for not claiming Social Security benefits conditional on 
resources (Hernanz et ali., 2004). Revealing earnings information to public services or to  healthcare 
players might act as a brake on take-up. In the case of ACS, the stigmatization issue i s certainly less 
important than for CMUC because only the CHI provider, apart from public services, is info rmed, 
whereas physicians know when patients benefit from CMUC (Desprès, 2010). Furthermore, knowing 
                                                             
2   Health, Health care and insurance survey (ESPS) is a biannual survey conducted by Irdes and the National 
Health Insurance Fund for Salaried Workers (CNAMTS). The survey is representative of 96% of the French 
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insurance, visits to a physician, consumption of medical goods and services, care and services administered 
by non-physician clinicians, hospitalization, reasons for not seeking care and opinions about health. 
3   Since  January  2011,  ACS is intended for hous eholds whose resources exceed 2 6%  of the  CMUC  plan 
eligibility threshold and will be extended to 30% in 2012 (PLFSS, 2011) 
4   Before government increased the amount of the voucher in August 2009 (see table 1). 3 
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that the non take-up of CMUC is lower compared to that of ACS, it is tempting to conclude that fear 
of stigmatization is not a major factor for ACS.  
Thus, the focus of this paper is to test the two main hypotheses put forward to explain the low take 
up of ACS, which are the lack of information on one hand and insufficient voucher amounts on the 
other hand.  
The analysis of the non take-up of social benefits faces two obstacles. The first one is to find a sample 
of eligible individuals. In the case of ACS, this is particularly difficult given the narrowness of the 
target population. Samples of eligible individuals from general population surveys are usually too 
small. In  addition, identification  of  the eligible  population  is  made  harder  by  the multitude  and 
accuracy of information to be collected in order to meet all eligibility criteria
5. Conducting a broad 
and representative survey of eligible individuals is then made even harder. 
The other obstacle is very dif ferent in  nature; it bears on revealing the reasons  for non take-up. 
Assuming that one   can  build a sample of eligible individuals , it is pos sible to distinguish the 
subpopulation receiving ACS benefits from the subpopulation  who did not apply for. One can then 
infer the reasons (informational, economic) for non ACS take-up by comparing both sub-populations. 
One may link for example the proximity of a household to relevant information to present or past 
benefits of other welfare payments, or assume that households who are less sensitive to  the ACS 
voucher are those whose incomes are the lowest ( i.e. make the assumption that the price elasticity 
of demand  increases with income)
6. But, on  the one hand, the  reasons are necessarily revealed 
indirectly,  and  on the  other hand, with  narrow target populations  such as  that of ACS, eligible 
population is very homogeneous, especially from an economic point of view, which leaves little hope 
to get results. 
It is also possible to  reveal directly the reasons for non take -up by interviewing individuals
7 but 
responses are then subjective and sensitive to question wording. These responses are very useful as 
they give a comprehensive overview of reasons, but give only indirect indications on expected effects 
of an information campaign or a voucher increase. 
In this study, we use a direct approach of public policy evaluation consisting in measuring the effects 
on the ACS take-up rate of a change in the subsidized CHI program in force. The implementation of 
this approach assumes of course that one can observe such changes. As  it can be seen from table 1 
and figure 1, it is the case since the introduction of this  program in 2005, especially concerning the 
voucher amounts. However, the evaluation of these  modifications relies on the observation of a 
control population kept out of the new rules. Indeed, a before and after analysis of the ACS take-up 
rate is insufficient because  the rate follows its own dynamics, independent of legislative changes 
which is therefore impossible to take into account robustly without observing a control population. 
                                                             
5   ACS eligibility assessment assumes examination of all household resources (labor income, capital, social 
benefits, pensions received, including benefits in kind like for instance owning an accommodation, or be 
housed free of charge) over the twelve months preceding the application. 
6   An alternative method is to identify price elasticities of demand for insurance in a general population survey 
and to infer the expected impact of the  voucher increase. This implies either  to have  data gathering 
heterogeneous price  c ontracts  (see  Auerbach  and ali, 2006,  Thomas,  1995),  or  to  introduce   strong 
assumptions (like Grignon and Kambia -Chopin, 2009), based on a utility function linking income effect and 
price effect). 
7   See Wittwer and ali., 2010, for a analysis of ACS take-up based on survey data. 4 
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This is even more relevant in the case of ACS as it is a relatively recent program, whose take-up rate 
is not stabilized (see figure 1). 
To  overcome  this  problem,  we  built  a  randomized  experiment.  The  principle  is  simple:  identify 
individuals  eligible  for  ACS  (or  more  precisely  individuals  potentially  eligible)  and  split  these 
individuals  randomly  into  groups  that  will  be  offered  different  ACS  voucher  amounts  and 
differentiated  access  to  information.  This  type  of  controlled  experiment  requires  the  active 
participation of involved institutions and therefore it is particularly costly for both the evaluation 
team as for the institutions. Given the resources at our disposal in this study, the experiment was 
conducted at local level precisely that of a local Health Insurance Fund of a city in northern France 
(Lille  city).  Consequently,  we  gain  in  robustness  by  building  a  control  group,  but  we  lose  in 
representativeness. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In order to better understand the role that CHI plays in 
gaining access to health care in France, the French health insurance system is firstly presented. The 
experimental design and the data are described in section 3 before specifying the methods used in 
section 4. Section 5 presents the results. These results are discussed with some concluding remarks 
in section 6. 
 
2.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1  The role of CHI in gaining access to health care in France 
The French health insurance system consists of two parts: the public health insurance (PHI) and the 
complementary  health  insurance  (CHI).  The  first  one  is  public,  compulsory  and  universal.  PHI  is 
mainly funded by social contributions deducted from people’s salaries, and partially from income tax 
(the  General  Social  Contribution,  (CSG).  It  is  divided  into  schemes  according  to  profession:  Our 
sample  of  insurees is,  as  the  majority  of  the  French  population,  insured  by  the National  Health 
Insurance Fund for Salaried Workers. Approximately 2% of the population (students and people who 
are  not  covered  by  a  professional  insurance  scheme)  receive  compulsorily  cover  through  the 
universal health insurance program, within the National Health Insurance Fund, called Couverture 
maladie universelle (CMU). CMU is free for low-income people and people earning more than a 
certain threshold, 9,029€ in 2010, have to pay a contribution of 8% (Fonds CMU, 2010). PHI covers 
only part of health expenditures: on average 75% of the government regulated price, about 90% for 
inpatient care, 66% for ambulatory care and very little for dental and optical care. However, some 
people (such as those suffering from long-term illnesses) benefit from full coverage of the treatment 
costs related to their situation. But this exemption from financial contributions does not mean that 
these patients don’t have to cope with relatively large out-of-pocket healthcare costs, due to, besides 
healthcare expenditures related to other illnesses they may have, flat fees, deductibles or charges 
exceeding the statutory fee for expenditures related to their chronic illness (Elbaum, 2008). 
Thus, the French PHI leaves part of the health care costs to be borne by insurees. However, part or all 
of  these  remaining  costs  can  be  covered  by  a  complementary  health  insurance  (CHI).  CHI  is 
additional, voluntary and private. In France, CHI is not only complementary to PHI, CHI covers co-
payment, but also supplemental to PHI because it can reimburse charges exceeding the statutory fee 5 
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or health care expenses not covered at all by PHI (for instance, orthodontic care, non-reimbursed 
medication, homeopathic medicine,...). CHI contracts can be purchased either individually or at the 
firm level. Since 2000, a free and public complementary health insurance, called CMUC (Couverture 
maladie universelle complémentaire), has been available for low-income people which pays off most 
of the out-of-pocket expenses and is funded jointly by the state and by private CHI providers. 
 
2.2  The Subsidized Insurance Program 
In order to improve financial access to CHI, a voucher program, called Aide Complémentaire Santé 
(ACS) was introduced in 2005. ACS is intended for households whose resources are between the 
CMUC eligibility threshold (in 2010 it is 634€ monthly for a single) plus 20%
8 (761€). The voucher is 
delivered by public health insurance funds and entitles holders to a premium discount for health 
insurance taken individually. ACS was created not only to encourage these households to purchase a 
CHI plan or a plan of better quality, but also to financially compensate those who were already 
covered.  Thus,  eligible  individuals  already  covered  can  benefit  retroactively  from  that  price 
reduction. This program can be looked upon as a smoothing instrument introduced to reduce the 
threshold effect induced by the free CMUC plan eligibility ceiling. 
The voucher amounts are determined by the number of beneficiaries and their age. They ranged 
from 100€ to 400€ per insuree in 2005 but have been revised upwards and new age brackets have 
been defined in August 2009. Table 1 shows the amount scales currently in use and those in force 
before August 2009, that corresponds to the time period of our study.  
According to the CMU Funds, the average annual cost of a CHI plan took out by ACS beneficiaries was 
764€ in 2009 (Fonds CMU, 2010). 
 
Table 1: ACS voucher amounts 
Per beneficiary aged   Amounts in force before August 2009 
Under 25  100€ 
25 - 59  200€ 
60 & more  400€ 
Per beneficiary aged  Amounts currently in force 
Under 16  100€ 
16 - 49  200€ 
50 - 59  350€ 
60 & more  500€ 
 
Uptake of ACS increased slowly since introduction but more steadily in recent months thanks to 
several information campaigns launched in January 2008 and lead by the mandatory health insurance 
funds. Despite that increase, four years later, the program concerned only a little over 500,000 
                                                             
8   Since  January  2011,  ACS  is  intended  for  households  whose  resources  exceed  26%  of  the  CMUC  plan 
eligibility threshold and will be extended to 30% in 2012 (PLFSS, 2011) 6 
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insured persons (figure 1). This result is far below the 2 million people initially targeted. However this 
figure must be regarded as a rough order of magnitude because only people not covered by a group 
CHI plan are eligible for ACS
9. After all, ACS take–up is low and this is even more surprising because a 
significant part of the eligible population is covered by a CHI taken individually and thus could get a 
price reduction for that contract
10. 
Figure 1: Number of ACS beneficiaries since enactment in 2005  
 
Source: Data from Fonds CMU website, http://www.cmu.fr/userdocs/PrevACS.02.09.pdf, consulted on December 9, 2010 
 
3.  THE EXPERIMENT 
This section firstly describes the experiment design and then the data employed in the analysis. 
3.1  Experiment design 
The experiment is an extension of a specific program already in place at the Health insurance funds 
(HIF) in Lille. This HIF proposed a specific treatment for individuals going to the HIF office in order to 
apply  for  CMUC  but  who  were  actually  eligible  for  ACS.  These  persons  were  offered  additional 
financial support during a briefing. This additional aid was supported by the welfare fund in Lille. 
Thus, to promote the ACS voucher program, HIF acted by improved information support and by more 
generous voucher. The national information campaign on the ACS program launched in 2008 gave us 
                                                             
9   In fact, it is estimated that one tenth of individuals eligible for ACS are covered by a collective insurance 
contract, if one approximates the eligible population by people belonging to the first decile group of living 
standards. This estimates rises to one fifth if the eligible population is approximated by the second decile 
group (Arnould & Vidal, 2008). 
10   Arnould &  Vidal, 2008,  estimated that 33% of individuals belonging to the first decile group of living 



































































































































































Guthmuller S., Jusot F., Wittwer J. March 2011. Affordability of Complementary Health Insurance in France: a Social Experiment 
the  opportunity  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  a  generalization  of  this  program  in  an  experimental 
setting
11. This campaign actually mailed information leaflet to people insured by HIF and identified as 
potentially eligible for ACS according to their resources r ecorded by the Family Allowances Fund 
(FAF)
12. We could then take advantage of these mailings to conduct the experiment. 
The information campaign on ACS began in Lille in January 2009. Based on the mailing lists of FAF and 
the HIF files, we could identify 4,209 insured persons
13 potentially eligible for ACS and not benefiting 
from it, according to their resources in 2007
14. This population, defining the experimental population, 
was randomly divided into three groups. 
The first group, named Control group further in this paper, received an ACS information leaflet and 
an  application  form  with  the  current  financial  aid.  The  second  group,  called  Treated  group  1, 
received the same letter but with a voucher increase. The third group, Treated group 2, received the 
same letter with the voucher increase but got also a social take-up proposal. The amounts of voucher 






                                                             
11   We  couldn’t  use  the  specific program  as  it  was  to  evaluate  its  potential  impact  on  the  entire  eligible 
population since treatments were proposed to a selected population (i.e. only to insures who came to HIF 
office in order to get information), not representative of the eligible population. 
12   In  French  “Caisse  d’allocations  familiales”.  FAF  offered  allowances  related  to  family,  children,  housing, 
minimum  incomes,…  .  Allowances  entitlement  and  amounts  are  conditional  to  income  level  of  the 
household. 
It is important to note that using mailing lists of FAF to identify potential eligible for ACS restricts the 
analysis to people entitled to allowances offered by FAF. Without being able to give a specific figure, it is 
likely  that  the  selected  sample  is  broadly  representative  of  the  eligible  population.  Nevertheless,  we 
selected a population already using social security. It means that we remove from analysis households 
eligible for ACS but systematically not taking-up social security in the one hand and households eligible for 
ACS but not eligible for family allowances in the other (For instance, elderly home owners.) 
13   Originally, 5,000 insured persons were identified. However, one must keep in mind that eligibility for ACS is 
evaluated in terms of household resources and the program itself is a benefit attributed to the household. 
Moreover, some households (the dual -earner couples in particular) are composed of several insured 
persons identified by FAF as potentially eligible. As during the information campaign the letters were sent 
by HIF to each insured persons, some households have received several letters. In our experimental setting, 
these cases are  problematic. Indeed, two insured  persons who were  randomly assigned into different 
groups but who belong to the same household may have received two different  letters. To address this 
contamination bias, we removed from our sample all insured persons belonging to the same household but 
assigned to different groups. In addition, we randomly selected an insured person within the household in 
which several insurees were assigned to the same group. Accordingly, the dual-earner couples are generally 
but identically under-represented in each group. The sample of experienced individuals was finally reduced 
to 4,209 insurees. 
14   Identification was made possible by  a query-based application originally designed by the Observatory on 
Non-Take Up of Social Rights and Public Services (Revil, 2008). 
15   The increased vouchers are only provisionally proposed. They last two years and the voucher is cut in half 
the second year. 8 
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Table 2: ACS voucher amounts proposed during experiment 
  Age 
Group  Under 25  between 25 & 59  60 & older 
Control  100€  200€  400€ 
Treated 1 & Treated 2  175€  350€  650€ 
Note: ACS voucher amounts per persons in the household. The amounts proposed to the control group are the official 
amounts offered at the time of experiment (January – July 2009, see table 1). For example, when CHI covers a 26 years old 
adult and 2 children under 25, the ACS voucher is (200€ + 2*100€)= 400€. This household could benefit from a 400€ 
discount on his annual insurance premium. The increased vouchers were those proposed by the HIF of Lille within the 
specific program in place before the experiment, which explains the non-uniform rate of increase between age groups. 
This sample of potential eligible insurees was invited to return an application form to HIF office for 
effective assessment of their eligibility for ACS. As already mentioned, the files were compiled on the 
basis of income year 2007, while eligibility for ACS is studied from the resources of the past 12 
months. 
The social take-up for the second treated group took the form of a group information meeting on 
ACS leaded by a social worker and took place at the HIF head office in Lille. These briefings were 
done before HIF assessment proceeding, unlike the proposed meetings in the current frame of the 
specific  treatment  for  insured  persons  who  were  not  eligible  for  CMUC  but  for  ACS.  Fourteen 
meetings were held from February to April 2009, about twice a week. The letters for the second 
treatment group were sent in waves over two months in order to manage the flow of  insurees 
responding positively to the briefing invitation. 
3.2  Data 
These insurees were followed-up over six months (January – July 2009) and we recorded how many 
application  forms  were  sent  back  and  how many  of  them  entitled  to ACS.  More  precisely,  data 
collected by HIF give, for each insuree, information about, his/her group, if an application form were 
sent  back,  if  after  assessment  proceedings  ACS were  notified  and if in  case  of  refusal,  if it  was 
justified by resources too high or otherwise too low for ACS eligibility, which in the latter case CMUC 
were offered. Finally, for insured persons assigned to treated group 2, the meeting participation and 
the date of attendance were recorded. 
These data were then matched to HIF administrative data. For each insuree in the sample, we got 
information  on  age,  sex,  if  he/she  has  got  beneficiaries  and  if  yes  how  old  they  are,  his/her 
reimbursement scheme on December 31, 2008 (employed, retired, unemployed, disability pension or 
allowance recipient, long term illness scheme), his/her total healthcare spending on outpatient care 
in 2008, and if he/she is covered by a CHI plan before (December 31, 2008) and after (September 30, 
2009) the experiment. We also know if the insured person was a CMUC recipient on December 31, 
2007. 
Appendix A presents the full set of variables used. 
Data on health care expenditures are those  reimbursed by the public health insurance one year 
before the experiment started. However, we only have information on ambulatory health care as 
inpatient cares are not recorded by HIF. But as described in the introduction, inpatient care is almost 9 
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entirely reimbursed by the public health insurance. So not taking these expenditures into account in 
the analysis does not much affect the willingness to buy a CHI, as CHI mostly covers ambulatory care 
expenditures. 
It is also important to note that insured persons, who were initially identified as eligible for ACS 
according to their resources in 2007, are actually not eligible
16, when they are covered by a  CHI 
received through employer. Unfortunately, data on CHI coverage recorded by the  National health 
insurance fund does not tell us if CHI were purchased through employer or individually. However, we 
will be able  to differentiate the two in further research thanks to a survey realized  on the same 
population after the experiment (Wittwer et al., 2010). 
Information on CHI plan status are collected by HIF thanks to a  computer information exchange 
standard, called NOEMIE (Norme Ouverte d’Echange entre Maladie et les intervenants Exterieurs). 
This standard allows electronic transmissions of healthcare invoices between HIF offices and CHI 
providers. Note however that all CHI providers are not affiliated to NOEMIE, which leads, in our data, 
to an underestimation of the CHI rate of coverage. 
All these collected data allow us to evaluate the effects of the specific letters sent to the treated 
groups, on the take-up for ACS. For convenience, we will use the word “treatments effect” to speak 
whether about the voucher increase, “treatment 1”, or whether about the voucher increase and the 
meeting  invitation,  “treatment  2”  and  we  will  speak  about  the  insured  persons  "response  to 
treatments". 
Table 3 provides a first description of the experienced population. We verify that random assignment 
led  to  very  similar  distributions  of  observed  variables  between  groups
17. Insured persons in the 
sample are, equally, men and women, 15% have at least one beneficiary under the age of 3
18. A large 
proportion of them, nearly 80% are aged 25 to 59  while the under 25 years old represent less than 
10% of each group. Then, if we consider the HIF scheme of the insured persons, 60% are employed, 
nearly 25% are unemployed because of  a disability and 15% have a retirement pension. Finally, we 
note that one month before the start of the experiment, an insured person of three was not covered 
by a CHI plan







                                                             
16 As ACS apply only to CHI bought individually. 
17   Chi-square tests performed do not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of independence. 
18   Note here that we only observed beneficiaries of the insured persons and not the households’ composition. 
19   This rate is well above the estimates on survey data for this population (This rate is 19% if the population is 
approximated by the first income decile and 14% for the second d ecile (Arnould and Vidal,  2008)). The 
gradual build-up of the standard exchange system NOEMIE certainly explains part of the difference: all CHI 
providers are not affiliated to the system in December 2008. 10 
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Table 3: Description of the population before experiment 
 
  Group 
  Control  Treated 1  Treated 2  Total 
Age 
Under 25  105*  7,5%  113  8,0%  108  7,7%  326  7,8% 
Btw. 25-59   1048  75,2%  1056  74,8%  1040  74,1%  3144  74,7% 
60 & older  241  17,3%  243  17,2%  255  18,2%  739  17,6% 
Sex 
Man  679  48,7%  691  48,9%  693  49,4%  2063  49,0% 
Woman  715  51,3%  721  51,1%  710  50,6%  2146  51,0% 
Beneficiary under of age 3 
No  1188  85,2%  1201  85,1%  1186  84,5%  3575  84,9% 
Yes  206  14,8%  211  14,9%  217  15,5%  634  15,1% 
HIF scheme  
Employed  812  58,3%      819  58,0%  830  56,2%  2462  58,5% 
Disability pension      339      24,3%      349     24,7%      338     24,1%      1026     24,4% 
Retired  210  15,1%  206  14,6%  200  14,3%  616  14,6% 
Unemployed  32  2,3%  38  2,7%  35  2,5%  105  2,5% 
Healthcare expenditures in 2008 
0€ - 200€  374  26,8%  350  24,8%  362  25,8%  1086  25,8% 
200€ - 700€  342  24,5%  366  25,9%  356  25,4%  1064  25,3% 
700€ - 2000€  339  24,3%  334  23,7%  358  25,5%  1031  24,5% 
>=2000€  339  24,3%  386  25,6%  327  23,3%  1028  24,4% 
Long-term illness care in 2008 
No  1009  72,4%  1014  71,8%  996  71,0%  3019  88,4% 
Yes  385  27,6%  398  28,2%  407  29,0%      1190  28,3% 
CHI coverage in 2008 
No  467  33,5%  477  33,8%  480  34,2%  1424  33,8% 
Yes  927  66,5%  935  66.2%  923  65,8%  2785  66,2% 
CMUC coverage in 2007         
No  1296  93,0%  1312  92,9%  1312  93,5%  3920  93,1% 
Yes  98  7,0%  100  7,1%  91  6,5%  289  6,9% 
Total  1394  100,0%  1412  100,0%  1403  100,0%  4209  100,0% 
Note: Descriptive statistics of the insured persons before the experiment. *In the control group, 105 (7.5%) insured persons are 
under the age of 25 on January 1, 2009. 
 
4.  METHODS 
 
The evaluation of the effect of the voucher increase and the information meeting on the demand for 
ACS is theoretically based on the potential outcome model, developed by Roy in 1951 and Rubin in 
1974 (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974). 11 
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4.1  Potential Outcome Model 
We are interested in estimating the causal effect of a treatment T on an outcome Y. This model 
defines  two  potential  outcomes,        the  outcome  of  individual  i  when  i  is  treated  and        the 
outcome of individual I when i is untreated. The causal effect of participating in the treatment for i is 
then equals to   =     -    . But    is always unobservable as only one of both outcome variables is 
observable;  when  i  is  treated,        is  realized  and        is  not  observed.        is  then  called  the 
counterfactual outcome and refers to the outcome Y that would have occurred if the individual were 
treated. 
The Roy-Rubin model defines several parameters to assess the causal effect of a measure. The most 
common parameter used in the literature is the average treatment effect on the treated (Average 
Treatment Effect On the Treated (ATT)). More precisely, we want to measure how the treatment 
affects the outcome variable in average compared to what it would be if treated people wouldn’t be 
treated. Formally,                                                              . 
As the counterfactual                is unobservable, aim is to find the best substitute to estimate 
ATT without bias. In practice, when attempting to estimate the impact of treatment, we calculate the 
difference between the mean of the outcome variable on individuals who received the treatment 
and  that  of  other  individuals  who  did  not  receive  the  treatment:     =  E[  \T=1]-  E[Y\T=0]. 
However,    is likely to be biased because treatment participation is often not independent of the 
potential outcomes, individuals self-select into treatment. In fact, individuals with positive    are 
more  likely  to  participate.  If  there  is  self-selection,  then                            and           
               and    is biased. Furthermore, we cannot estimate the counterfactuals. 
Consequently, ATT estimate is unbiased only if                                       is verified, that is 
if           . 
In order to account for the potential selection bias, we use three different methods (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2008). Firstly we constructed an experimental design; next we use matching methods, 
and finally a bivariate Probit regression. 
4.2  Effect of the voucher increase and the meeting proposal 
Randomized experiment 
Within the framework of an experimental design, treatment is randomly assigned across individuals. 
Untreated individuals form the control group and treated individuals the treated group. Thus if the 
sample of individuals is sufficiently large, random assignment ensures that both groups are similar, 
not only on observable variables but also on unobservable ones. It solves the self-selection issue by 
construction.  Formally  we  have,                                              and                  
                        . 
In our analysis we defined two different treatments; an ACS voucher increase for the first treated 
group  and  an  information  meeting  proposal in  addition  to  the  voucher  increase  for  the  second 
treated  group. As  these  treatments  were  randomly  assigned,  evaluation is  primarily  based  on  a 
quantitative review of returned application forms, ACS proposals and refusals in the different groups. 12 
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The  impact  of  treatments  can  then  be  estimated  by  difference  in  means  between  treated  and 
untreated groups. Comparison between groups is done with Chi square tests. 
4.3  Impact of the meeting participation 
Propensity score matching methods 
Individuals assigned to the second treated group were invited, to an information meeting on ACS. 
Some of them attended the meeting, others  did not. So, it is likely that individuals self-selected 
themselves i. e. individuals with positive expected outcome are more likely to participate. Thus, we 
first use propensity score matching methods in order to control for potential bias on observables 
(Heckman et al., 1997), (Heckman et al., 1998), (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The aim is to estimate 
the average causal effect of meeting participation on the probability of applying for ACS for those 
individuals who went to the meeting (    ). Treatment T is here defined as meeting participation. 
Matching methods consist of finding pairs of ‘identical’ individuals, one belonging to the treated 
group (people who did go to the meeting) and another belonging to the untreated group (people 
who did not go to the meeting). The goal is to build a “control group” with similar characteristics as 
the  treated  population  in  order  to  compare  them.  For  each  individual  belonging  to  the  treated 
population, we seek his pair in the control population by adjusting for confounding variables (Xi). 
Matching methods rely on two assumptions: (1) Conditional independence: all variables that are 
relevant for jointly determining treatment and outcomes are observed and included in Xi. So that we 
have:                      .  Selection  is  only  based  on  observables.  (2)  Overlapping  support:     
                 . 
The average effect of the meeting participation on the participants (ATT) estimated using a matching 
procedure can be written as follows:      
 
  
                      
  
     
  
    , where    and    are 
respectively the number of individuals who didn’t attend the meeting, and the number of individuals 
who participated. W(i,j) is the weighting chosen to build the counterfactual i.e. the weighting that 
selects individual (individuals) j in the non participant population who is (are) the closest to individual 
i in the participant population. We then have             
  
     for all i. 
Since conditioning on a high-dimensional vector of observable characteristics is complex, we follow 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and match on the predicted meeting participation probability.  
Several techniques have been developed to estimate the weighting. The first one we use is called 
nearest neighbor and consists in finding a pair in the untreated group with the closest propensity 
score (in that case            . We then decided to use the four nearest neighbours because we 
have a relative large group of untreated compared to the number of treated individuals (Abadie et 
al., 2004) (in that case              . Moreover, we allow for replacement (one control individual 
can be matched to more than one treated individual) because it better control for bias although it’s 
less efficient in terms of variance.  
However  matching  on  the  nearest  neighbour(s)  has  the  disadvantage  of  pairing  two  individuals 
regardless of the distance between the participant and its nearest neighbor in the non participant 
population. Thus, if the nearest neighbor in terms of propensity score, is very remote, the pair of 
individuals may have very different characteristics. The Radius matching control that risk in excluding 13 
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pairs of individuals whose score difference exceeds a fixed value. We also apply kernel matching 
(Heckman et al., 1998) which chooses the matches by a kernel – weighted average of the outcome of 
all non-treated individuals (in that case;         
  
             
   
   
  
   
             
   
). A central issue of these non-
parametric methods is the selection of the bandwidth value. Large values tend to decrease variance 
but increase bias. We decided to use the default Epanechnikov kernel function and a bandwidth 
value of 0.01 for kernel matching and radius matching. 
Finally, following Hirano et al., 2003, we estimate the counterfactual by weighting each individual not 
participating by the inverse of its propensity to return an application form. Formally, the average 
effect of the meeting participation on the participant population is:      
           
    
        
        
            
   
           
   
 
Propensity score matching is a two-step method. We first estimate the propensity to participate to 
the meeting using a binary outcome model (Logit) controlling for regressors:                   
  .  We  then  calculate  the  average  meeting  effect  on  the  outcome  variable:  the  probability  of 
applying for ACS. For more information on all of these estimators, the reader may consult Heckman 
et al., 1997 and 1998, Givord, 2010 and Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008. 
Bivariate probit model 
However, matching methods do not account for heterogeneity bias due to unobservables. Indeed, 
regressors at our disposal characterize only imperfectly experimented individuals. They obviously 
differ in many other dimensions and some of these can both explain their propensity to attend the 
meeting and to apply for ACS. For example, the interest they have in their own health. In other 
words, it is possible that previous methods impute to the meeting the impact on demand for ACS 
which is actually the result of unobserved variables. It will be necessary to extend the statistical 
analysis to verify that it is not. The challenge is to identify one or more variables that could influence 
the probability of going to the meeting but not the probability of returning a form. 
In order to control for potential bias due to endogeneity of the meeting participation, we use a 
bivariate probit model (Lollivier, 2009). We define two latent variables,    
  the propensity of meeting 
participation and    
  the propensity of returning an application form as follow: 
                                         
For which we respectively observe            
       and            
      . The conditional rule of    
  if 
   
  is realized can be written as: 
 
Where the error term u follows a normal distribution N(0,   
         ). α=ATT is our parameter of 
interest. Under this estimation technique, the betas (the coefficients on the Xs) are restricted to be 14 
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the same for people who went to the meeting and people who did not. In other words, we suppose 
that meeting participation has merely an intercept effect on the probability of applying for ACS
20. 
But this model  rely on the use of an identification variable i.e. at least one variable that has a 
significant effect on the probability of attending the meeting but not on the probability of returning 
an application form to get ACS. Theoretically, we can suppose that the meeting date proposed to the 
second treated group should have a direct and significant effect on the probability to attend it
21. 
5.  RESULTS 
This section presents the result of the experiment. To evaluate the treatments effectiveness we focus 
on two outcome variables: the rate of returned application forms and the rate of ACS notified, i.e. 
the  proportion  of  experienced  individuals  who  effectively  received  an  ACS  voucher  after  re-
assessment of the eligibility criteria by HIF Lille. The random assignment of the treatments allows 
direct comparisons of the outcome variables between groups. 
We now detail how groups respond to treatments. As stated above, we first focus our attention on 
the effect of treatments on the rate of returned forms and in a second time on ACS notifications. 
Weak but significant effect of the voucher increase 
We investigate if subsequent to the letter received from HIF, insured persons applied for ACS. We 
then assess the demand or the interest for ACS by the number of returned application forms. Out of 
the 4,209 letters sent, 701 complete forms were received, that is a return rate of 17%. The first 
observation is that the rate of returned forms is generally quite modest (Table 4). 
We  now measure  differences  between  groups  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  treatment.  For  the 
control group, 16% of  policyholders returned a completed form to get ACS (222 cases). Insured 
persons having been offered only an increased voucher (treated group 1) significantly more often 
completed  a  form  than  insured  persons  of  the  control  group,  with  a  return  rate  of  18,6%  (5% 
statistical significance level). Increasing ACS voucher seems to have an impact on the probability of 






                                                             
20   Alternatively, if we suppose that meeting participation has not only an intercept effect but also a slope 
effect (i.e., the betas differ according to  meeting participation as well), then an endogenous switching 
probit model is called for. 
21   Alternatively, we could have used assignment to the first treated group as an instrument and estimate a 
local average treatment effect. However, as it is explained in the results section, in our case, assignment to 
the first treated group is not a valid instrument because the meeting proposal has a negative and significant 
impact on the probability to apply for ACS. 15 
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Table 4 : Returned application forms for ACS by groups 
  Completed forms  95% CI  Number of insured 
persons 
 
Control  222*  15,9%  (14,0% ; 17,8%)     1394   100,0% 
Treated 1  262  18,6%  (16,5% ; 20,6%)  1412  100,0% 
Treated 2  217  15,5%  (13,6% ; 17,4%)  1403  100,0% 
Of which   with meeting  35  28,0%  (20,0% ; 36,0%)  125  100,0% 
           without meeting  182  14,2%  (12,3% ; 16,2%)  1278  100,0% 
Total  701  16,7%  (15,5% ; 17,8%)  4209  100,0% 
Note: Number of returned application forms for ACS by groups. *In the control group, among the 1394 insured persons 222 
(15.9%) returned an application form to get ACS.  
 
 
Comparing rates of returned forms in the control group and in the first treated group allow assessing 
the voucher amount elasticity of demand for ACS. This elasticity is calculated by the ratio of the 
growth rate of the probability of returned forms and the growth rate of the voucher amount
22. It is 
0,22 (Table 5). This indicator reflects the sensitivity of insured persons to the voucher amount, and in 
our case, it means that an increase in ACS voucher  of 10% increases the probability of applying for 
ACS by 2.2%. 
Table 5: Voucher amount elasticity of the demand for ACS 
  Returned form  ACS notification 
  Elasticity  95% C.I.  Elasticity  95% C.I. 
         
Total  0,22  (-0,01 ; 0,49)  0,49  (0,11 ; 0,96) 
CHI coverage in 2008 
No  0,23*  (-0,16 ; 0,76)  0,51  (-0,12 ; 1,47) 
Yes  0,21  (-0,06 ; 0,55)  0,48  (-0,03 ; 1,06) 
Note: Elasticity calculated as the ratio between the growth rate of the probability to return an application form (to get ACS) 
between control and treated group 1, on the one hand, and the growth rate of voucher amount between the national 
amount and the increased amount for insured persons under 59 years (the rate being slightly lower for those over 60 years) 
on the other. 
The voucher increase allows better targeting of people actually eligible  
After looking at returned application forms, we can also examine how many of them finally entitled 
to ACS. Indeed, ACS was not awarded to all applying insured persons because some of them had 
resources outside eligibility thresholds.  
ACS agreements are presented in Table 6 and cases of ACS refusal in Table 7. 
                                                             
22   By using a growth rate of 75% for the voucher amount (although this figure is equal to 62.5% for the over 60 
years), we choose to under-estimate an aggregate elasticity rather than to estimate elasticity by age groups 
with insufficient accuracy because of the small number of people over age 60. 16 
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Table 6 : ACS agreements per group  
  Number of 
ACS 
agreements 













Control  110  7,9%  (6,5% ; 9,3%)  49,6%  (42,9% ; 56,2%) 
Treated 1  152  10,8%  (9,1% ; 12,4%)  58,0%  (52,0% ; 64,0%) 
Treated 2  125  8,9%  (7,4% ; 10,4%)  57,6%  (51,0% ; 64,2%) 
Attended the meeting  22  17,6%  (10,8% ; 24,4%)  62,9%  (46,0% ; 79,6%) 
No meeting  103  8,1%  (6,6% ; 9,6%)  56,6%  (49,3% ; 63,9%) 
Total  387  9,2%  (8,3% ; 10,1%)  55,2%  (51,5% ; 58,9%) 
Note: Number of ACS agreements by group and their proportion in relation to the total number of insured persons included in 
the experiment and the total number of completed application forms. 
 
Table 7 : Cases of ACS refusal 
 
  CMUC agreement  Resources above upper limit 
  Number  % in relation 




% in relation 





Number  % in relation 




% in relation 






Control  25*  1,8%  11,3%  87  6,2%  39,2% 
Treated 1  25  1,8%  9,5%  85  6,0%  32,4% 
Treated 2  21  1,5%  9,7%  71  5,1%  32,7% 
Attended to meeting  2  1,6%  5,7%  11  8,8%  31,4% 
No meeting  19  1,5%  10,4%  60  4,7%  33,0% 
Total  71  1.7%  10,1%  241  5,8%  34,7% 
Note:  Number  of  CMUC  agreements  and  the  number  of  refusals  due  to  resources  above  the  limit  of  eligibility,  and  the 
corresponding percentage in relation to the total number of insured persons and in relation to all completed application forms. 
 
In total, 55% of application forms entitled to ACS (Table 6), 10% to CMUC because resources of 
households were below the eligibility threshold for ACS and 36% to refusal because of resources 
above the upper limit (Table 7). The refusal rate for applications is substantial for a FAF preselected 
population. Finally, only 9% of insured persons got ACS, 2% got CMUC and 6% were refused ACS and 
CMUC. 
 
Comparing rates of ACS agreements in relation to the total of letters sent between the different 
groups leads to conclusions quite similar to those drawn from the analysis based on returned forms, 17 
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the  difference  between  control  and  second  treated  group,  however,  being  accentuated.  The 
proportion of ACS agreements is 8% in the control group and 11% in the first treated group. 
The voucher amount elasticity of the probability of ACS agreement is 0.48 (Table 5), an elasticity 
significantly higher compared to the one calculated on the basis of the rate of returned forms. This 
increase in elasticity is explained by a much lower proportion of returned forms in the control group 
than in the treated groups. In fact, the proportion of ACS agreement among returned application 
forms is only 49% in the control group, whereas it is 58% in treated group 1 and 57,6% in treated 
group 2 (Table 6). 
However, the observable characteristics of insured persons applying for ACS among the three groups 
are very similar (Wittwer et al., 2010). Therefore, the explanation for the difference in agreement 
rates between control and treated groups cannot be attributed to their observable characteristics. 
We can then speculate that the increased amount of ACS voucher decides some individuals, among 
the poorest, to apply for ACS, whereas they would not apply for it given the expected premium 
subtracted from the national ACS voucher amounts. The proposed treatments seems then to have 
selected  more  specifically  insurees  actually  eligible,  ie  the  poorest  among  the  experimental 
population since the refusal rate due to resources above the upper limit is lower in both treated 
groups than in the control group (Table 6). 
Meeting proposal seems to nullify the impact of the increased voucher 
For the second treated group, whose members received an invitation to a briefing and an increased 
ACS proposal, the return rate of application forms ranks 15,5%. Although this rate of return is slightly 
lower than the one in the control group, statistical analysis does not establish that it is significantly 
lower (5% level of significance). However, there is a marked difference if one considers only the 
insured persons who didn’t attend the briefing; the return rate is now 14.2%, whereas the same 
voucher amounts were offered. 
Among the 1,403 members of the second treated group, only 125 actually attended the meeting to 
which they were invited (9%). Among these, 35 returned a form (28%). The proportion is significantly 
higher than that in other groups (at the 1% level of significance). This result will be discussed later. 
As expected, the briefing invitation seems to impact positively the demand for ACS to people who 
attended, but in a less expected manner, the meeting invitation played negatively on people who did 
not participate. One explanation is that part of the insured persons in the second treated group, 
those who did not go to the meeting, held the meeting attendance for compulsory and therefore did 
not  consider  it  a  good  think  to  apply  for  ACS  since  they  could  not  attend  the  meeting.  This 
interpretation seems to be confirmed by the post survey and a qualitative study which states that 
some insured persons who went to the meeting understood their presence at this meeting as a 
prerequisite to obtaining ACS (Wittwer et al., 2010).  
This  shows  how  chosen  forms  of  communication  determine  the  effectiveness  of  information 
transmitted. The complexity of the ACS program asks for direct information, face to face, but getting 
information by HIF seems to deter some people to apply for. This certainly legitimises the use of third 
party institutions (associations, CHI providers, social workers ...) to spread information (Chauveaud 
and Warin, 2009). 18 
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Significant impact of meeting attendance on ACS application 
As  indicated  above,  insured  persons  who  attended  the  meeting  are  significantly  more  likely  to 
complete an application form (and to get an ACS agreement). This result is expected and encouraging 
but must be strengthened as we cannot rely on the experimental nature of our data. 
People, who attended the briefing, have a particular profile. These individuals are older, had more 
often LTC, weren’t  covered by a CHI at the beginning of experiment and had higher healthcare 
expenditures in 2008. People having a disability allowance are also significantly less likely to attend 
the meeting (Wittwer et al., 2010). These results raise questions about whether their greater ACS 
take-up is not simply explained by this particular profile. To verify this, we use several methods.  
Firstly we use several matching methods in order to control for potential bias on observables
23. Table 
8  confirms the preceding results.  Whatever the specification used, m eeting participation has a 
significant and positive effect on the probability of applying for ACS.  But this result is not sufficient. 
Indeed, the variables at our disposal only imperfectly characterize the experienced individuals. These 
obviously differ in many other dimensions and some of them can both explain their propensity to  go 
to the meeting and to apply for ACS, for example their interest in their health. In other words, it is 
possible that previous estimates attribute to the meeting the impact on the demand for ACS, which is 
actually the result of unobserved variables.  
Finally, we intend to control for potential bias due to unobservables by estimating a bivariate probit 
model. We use the meeting date in months as an identification variable. We see that the correlation 
coefficient (rho=-0,14) is negative but not statistically different from 0. Therefore, we can conclude 
that there is no selection bias due to unobservable in our case. The marginal effect of meeting 
participation on the demand for ACS can be estimated by a simple probit model and is very similar to 
the marginal effect estimated with the other estimation strategies (table 8). The participants have a 
probability of returning an application form from 11 to 13 percent points higher compared to what it 









                                                             
23 See appendix B for the estimates of the likelihood of meeting attendance. 19 
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Table 8: Evaluation of the meeting attendance effect  
Propensity score matching methods  ATT 
Nearest neighbor  (1 - 1)   0,112** (0,0527) 
4 nearest neighbors  (1 - 4)  0,13*** (0,0492) 
Radius  0,115*** (0,0540) 
Kernel  0,121*** (0,0431) 
Hirano, Imbens et Ridder (2003)  0,128*** (0,0427) 
Bivariate probit model 
Identification variable: meeting’s date 
Rho=-0,145 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1)=0,10296 
Prob > chi2 = 0,7483 
0,112*** (0,0414) 
Probit model  0,118*** (0,0405) 
Treatment : meeting attendance  125 
N  1403 
Statistical significance levels * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are the standard errors. For the propensity score matching methods values in parentheses are the 
bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficients estimated with 100 replications. Estimates of the methods of nearest neighbors, 
radius and kernel were performed using Stata command developed by Leuven and Sianesi, 2003.  
 
ACS only poorly reaches its target population particularly because of its complexity 
One important lesson of this experiment is the difficulty of establishing an information campaign on 
ACS, which ultimately reaches its target population with difficulty. 
Despite sending a letter to all insured persons potentially eligible, less than one of five has finally 
returned a form to obtain ACS (with a return rate of 17%). Equally troubling, the rate of returned 
form and its sensitivity to the voucher amount are very similar among the 66% of the sample that 
were covered by CHI plan before experiment and the remaining 33% who were not initially covered. 
Indeed, the rate of returned forms of persons initially covered is 16.4% in the control group and 19% 
in the treated group 1 against 15% and 17,6% for those not covered, these differences were not 
significant. Similarly, we do not note any significant difference in the elasticity depending on CHI 
status before experiment, it is 0,23 for those initially covered against 0,21 for those not covered 
(table 5). This result seems very surprising because ACS appears indeed as a boon for individuals who 
have already incurred expenses for the purchase of a CHI plan, which one would expect a massive 
take-up, increased as much as the increased voucher. Finally, in the treated group 2, only 9% of those 
invited actually attended the briefing. 20 
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These results raise immediately the matter of the number letters that actually reached the insurees. 
This is obviously not known precisely, but it is likely that some addresses were erroneous; even more 
that mobility is closely associated with precariousness. 
They  also  illustrate  the  difficulty  for  HIF  to  inform  on  ACS.  The  low  success  of  the  information 
campaign by letters and the complexity of ACS probably call for the use of more direct or face to face 
information. However, our results also show that the invitation to inquire information in the HIF 
offices discourages some to apply for ACS. This certainly legitimates the use of third party institutions 
(associations, CHI providers, social workers ...) to spread information (Chauveaud and Warin, 2009). 
Moreover, among the application forms returned to the HIF, only 55% were entitled to ACS and 9% 
of  the  experimented  insurees  finally got  ACS.  This  refusal  rate is  considerable  for  a  preselected 
population with regard to its resources and social benefits received by FAF. This is an essential point 
to  take  into  account.  The  cost  of  applying  for  ACS  for  those  potentially  eligible  is  probably 
considerably strengthened by the low probability of success. This is common to all programs with 
access based on resources but particularly reinforced in the case of ACS, given the complexity of 
eligibility criteria and the narrowness of the target population. 
These intuitions are confirmed by the qualitative analysis that was conducted to collect the needs 
and expectations of the experimented population during the meetings observations (see Wittwer et 
al. 2010). 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The results of this experiment show that the increase in the amount of the voucher slightly improves 
the rate of application for ACS and better targets population that are actually eligible. We can then 
expect a positive effect of the increased amount of ACS put in place by 1 January 2010 for eligible 
persons  aged  50  and  over  (table  1).  However,  the  additional  amount  is  smaller  than  the  one 
proposed in the context of this experiment, so that we can only expect a small-scale effect. This 
experiment also suggests that the central issue of ACS low take-up rate is not the CHI cost itself but 
most certainly that of the access to information, the cost and the complexity of the application 
process. However, it also shows the difficulty of reaching the target population with an information 
campaign by letters, such as the one implemented at the national level in 2008-2009 and the cons 
productive character of the invitation to a briefing. Finally the fact that eligibility is not certain is also 
an  aggravating  factor.  As  such,  expanding  the  target  population  from  1  January  2011  may  be 
promoting the take-up of ACS (PLFSS, 2011). 
 
The experimental approach used in this study has the advantage of relying on the assessment of a 
program,  implemented  in  vivo  and  therefore  avoid  selection  issues  that  are  usually  the  main 
difficulty in evaluating public policy. However, it is not without limit. On the one hand, the studied 
population is not representative of the French eligible population, the eligible population to ACS in 
Lille  having  specificities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effectiveness  of  treatments  depends  on  the 
institution conducting them and on its relationships with the insured persons, with insurees of most 
modest means in particular. Nothing says that the same experiment on a similar population would 
have the same effect in another HIF. Finally, the major drawback of an experiment is that of the 21 
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length of follow up. It is likely that the increased vouchers have a long term impact along with the 
slow  diffusion  of  information,  that  we  cannot  studied  because  a  randomized  experiment  is 
necessarily limited in time, in particular due to its cost. However this analysis will be strengthened by 
the  use  of  a  post  survey  on  the  same  population.  Moreover,  it  will  be  needed  to  control  for 
unobservables to ascertain the significant effect of the information meeting. 
Finally, receiving an ACS notification does not necessary mean using it to purchase CHI coverage. It 
will therefore be interesting, in further research, to examine the effects of the treatments on CHI 
coverage. 
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APPENDIX A 
Description of variable set 
Type  Variables   Description 
Experimental 
data 
Completed form returned 
Dummy variable=1 if insured person returned completed application 
form, 0 otherwise 
ACS proposal 
Dummy variable=1 if insured person got an ACS proposal after HIF 
assessment, 0 otherwise 
CMUC proposal 
Dummy variable =1 if insured person got an ACS refusal but a CMUC 
proposal (in case of resources below ACS eligibility threshold) after HIF 
assessment 
ACS refusal 
Dummy variable =1 if insured person got an ACS and CMUC refusal (in 
case of resources above ACS eligibility cap)  after HIF assessment, 0 
otherwise 
Meeting participation 
Dummy  variable  =1  if  insured  person  went  to  the  meeting,  0 
otherwise (only for treated group 2) 
Meeting date proposal 
Indicates  the  date  of  the  meeting  proposed  in  the  second  letter 




Age  Insured person 
Age²  Insured person 
Gender  Insured person 
Beneficiary younger than 
age 3 
Dummy variable=1 if insured person got at least one beneficiary under 
the age of 3, 0 otherwise 
Health, Health 
care utilization 
and CHI coverage 
Health care expenditures 
in 2008  
0€ - 200€ 
200€ – 700€ 
700€ - 2000€ 
>= 2000€ 
Long term diseases care 
in 2008 
Dummy variable=1 if insured person got long term disease cares in 
2008, 0 otherwise (LTC) 
Complementary health 
insurance coverage in 
2008 (December 31) 
Dummy variable =1 if insured person is covered by a CHI in 2008, 0 
otherwise 
Complementary health 
insurance coverage after 
experiment (September 
30, 2009) 
Dummy  variable  =1  if  insured  person  is  covered  by  a  CHI  after 
experiment, 0 otherwise 
CMUC coverage in 2007 
(December 31) 





Old age pension 
Unemployed 
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APPENDIX B 
Likelihood of meeting attendance (treated group 2) 
Variable  O.R. 
   
Age  1,14*** 
Age²  0,99*** 
Woman  0,83 
HIF scheme   
Employed  Réf 
Disability allowance  0,66 
Retired  0,63 
Unemployed  0,91 
Beneficiary under age 3  1,52 
CMUC coverage in 2007  0,90 
CHI coverage in 2008  0,65** 
Long-term illness care in 2008  1,20 
Ambulatory healthcare expenditures in 2008   
< 200€  0.59* 
200€ - 700€  0.46** 
700€ - 2000€  0.96 
>= 2000€  Réf. 
   
N  1403 
Statistical significance levels * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Note : Logistic regression of the probability of attending the briefing (dummy variable : 1 the insuree attended the briefing, 0 







   24 
 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F., Wittwer J. March 2011. Affordability of Complementary Health Insurance in France: a Social Experiment 
REFERENCES 
 
Abadie A., Drukker D., Leber Herr J. et Imbens G.W. (2004), « Implementing matching estimators for 
average treatment effects in Stata », Stata Journal, vol. 4, n° 3, pp. 290-311. 
Arnould  M-L.  et  Vidal  G.  (2008),  «  Typologie  des  contrats  les  plus  souscrits  auprès  des 
complémentaires en 2006 », Etudes et Résultats, n°663. 
Auerbach D, Ohri S. 2006. Price and Demand for Non-Group Health Insurance. Inquiry 43(2): 122-134. 
Caliendo M, Kopeinig S. 2008. Some Practical Guidance for The Implementation of Propensity Score 
matching. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(1) : 31-72.  
Chauveaud  C,  Warin  P.  2009.  Favoriser  l’accès  aux  soins  des  bénéficiaires  de  minima  sociaux. 
Expliquer la CMU-C et l’ACS aux populations potentiellement éligibles. Odenore collection Etude, 32. 
Desprès C. 2010. La Couverture maladie universelle, une légitimité contestée : analyse des attitudes 
de médecins et dentistes ￠ l’égard de ses bénéficiaires. Pratiques et Organisation des soins. 41(1) :33-
43. 
Elbaum M. 2008. Participation financière des patients et équilibre de l’Assurance maladie. Lettre de 
l’OFCE. 301. 
Fonds  CMU.  2008.  L’aide  ￠  la  complémentaire  santé  en  2007.  Rapport  du  Fonds  CMU  au 
Gouvernement  sur  l’évolution  du  prix  et  du  contenu  des  contrats  ayant  ouvert  droit  ￠  l’aide 
complémentaire santé en 2007 (en application de l'article L.863-5 du Code de la Sécurité Sociale).Juin 
2008. 
Fonds CMU. 2009. Rapport d’activité 2008 du Fonds CMU, 13 mai 2009, 
http://www.cmu.fr/userdocs/Rapport%202008.pdf 
Fonds  CMU.  2010.  L’aide  ￠  la  complémentaire  santé  en  2009.  Rapport  du  Fonds  CMU  au 
Gouvernement  sur  l’évolution  du  prix  et  du  contenu  des  contrats  ayant  ouvert  droit  ￠  l’aide 
complémentaire santé en 2009 (en application de l'article L.863-5 du Code de la Sécurité Sociale).Juin 
2010. 
Fonds CMU. 2010. Bénéficiaires de l'ACS. Séries mensuelles des attestations délivrées et trimes-
trielles des attestations utilisées. septembre 2010, http://www.cmu.fr/userdocs/PrevACS.02.09.pdf. 
Givord P. 2010. Méthodes économétriques pour l’évaluation de politiques publiques. Document de 
travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques de l’INSEE. n°G 2010/08. 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F. Wittwer J., Desprès C. (2010), „le recours à l’Aide complémentaire santé : les 
enseignements d’une expérimentation sociale à Lille », Document de travail Irdes n° 36. 2010/12 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F. Wittwer J., Desprès C. (2011), „le recours à l’Aide complémentaire santé : les 
enseignements d’une expérimentation sociale à Lille », Document de travail LEDa-LEGOS, à paraître 
en ligne : www.legos.dauphine.fr 25 
 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F., Wittwer J. March 2011. Affordability of Complementary Health Insurance in France: a Social Experiment 
Grignon M, Kambia-Chopin B. 2009. Income and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in 
France. Document de travail Irdes. DT24. 
Heckman JJ, Ichimura H, Todd P. 1998. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. Review of 
Economic Studies. 65(2): 261-294. 
Heckman JJ, Ichimura H, Todd PE. 1997. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence 
from evaluating a job training program. Review of Economic Studies. 64(4):605-654. 
Hernanz V, Malherbet F, Pellizzari M. 2004. Take-up of welfare benefits in OECD countries: review of 
the evidence. Document de travail de l’OECD, sur les affaires sociales, l'emploi et les migrations. 17. 
Hirano  K,  Imbens  GW,  Ridder  G.  2003.  Efficient  estimation  of  average  treatment  effects  using 
estimated propensity score. Econometrica. 71(4): 1161-1189 
Imbens GM, Wooldridge JM. 2009. Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation. 
Journal of Economic Literature. 47(1) :5-86. 
Jusot F, Wittwer J. 2009. L'accès financier aux soins en France : bilan et perspective. Regards croisés 
sur l’économie. 5(1) :102-109. 
Kambia-Chopin B, Perronnin M, Pierre A, Rochereau T. 2008. La complémentaire santé en France en 
2006 : un accès qui reste inégalitaire. Résultats de l’Enquête Santé Protection Sociale 2006 (ESPS 
2006). Questions d’économie de la santé. 132. 
Legal A, Jusot F, Wittwer J. 2008, La complémentaire santé : un bien normal ?, communication lors 
des  30è  Journées  des  Économistes  de  la  Santé  Français,  Paris,  4  et  5  décembre  2008, 
http://www.ces-asso.org/docs/articles_JESF2008/legal_a.pdf. 
Leuven E, Sianesi B. 2003. psmatch2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score 
matching,  common  support  graphing,  and  covariate  imbalance  testing, 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html., version 4.0.2. 
Lollivier S. 2006. Econométrie avancée des variables qualitative. Economica. Paris 
PLFSS. 2011. Projet de loi de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2011. http://www.securite-
sociale.fr/chiffres/lfss/lfss2011/2011_plfss.pdf  
Revil H. 2008. Identifier des populations en non-recours aux dispositifs de l'Assurance maladie : 
proposition de méthode. Recherches et Prévisions. 93 :102-109. 
Rosenbaum PR, Rubin DB. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for 
causal effects. Biometrika. 70:41-55. 
Roy AD. 1951. Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings. Oxford Economic Papers, New Series. 
3(2):135-146. 
Rubin DB. 1974. Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. 
Journal of Educational Psychology. 66(5):688-701. 26 
 
Guthmuller S., Jusot F., Wittwer J. March 2011. Affordability of Complementary Health Insurance in France: a Social Experiment 
Thomas K. 1995. Are subsidies enough to encourage the uninsured to purchase health insurance? An 
analysis of underlying behaviour. Inquiry. 31(4) :415-424. 
Wittwer J, Jusot F, Guthmuller S, Desprès C, Renaud T. 2010. Le recours ￠ l’Aide complémentaire 
santé à Lille : résultats d’une expérimentation sociale. Rapport final dans le cadre de l’appel ￠ projet 
d’expérimentations sociales 2008 du Haut commissariat aux Solidarités actives contre la pauvreté. 